Two into One Won’t Go
In April 2004, the management of Aviva puzzled over what to do with their two large With Profits funds.
One of the funds, the fund which contained business written as the old Commercial Union and General Accident (the CGNU fund), was healthy and robust. The slush fund (called the inherited estate) it had built up through keeping guarantees and bonuses low was larger than the management felt was necessary. Shareholder value could surely be enhanced if they could only find a way of accessing this excess, as it could if they could merge the fund with its sister fund and enjoy economies of scale.
Unfortunately the other With Profits fund, made up of business written as the old Norwich Union, was coughing and wheezing. Back in 2004 the markets were some way off their 1999 peak and all the promises the Norwich Union fund had made to policyholders were in jeopardy of not being met unless the company took some action. This weakness was a barrier to their desire to merge the two funds because policyholders in the strong CGNU fund would never agree to merge with such a weak fund and jeopardise future returns.
They were not the only insurance company with a threadbare slush fund. Most With Profits companies in the same position decided that the best way to be sure that they could honour their guarantees was to get out of risky investments and invest in assets, such as government gilts, that they could have confidence would deliver the required returns.
But Aviva knew that a retrenchment to safe investments would rule out the possibility of the two funds merging in the future. It would be better if they could find a way to get the slush fund big again and the best way to do this was to generate strong investment returns.
The Gamble
A unilateral decision to increase the charges with effect from 1st May 2004 was made with a view to the extra charge boosting the slush fund. An extra 0.75% per year would be deducted from every policyholder’s investment which would give the fund the extra security it needed to stay invested in shares and commercial property.
This 2004 charge implementation was in stark contrast to the much heralded ‘choice’ for clients in their 2008 reattribution offer. The charge effectively resulted in a change to the contract terms and passed the onus for meeting the guarantees away from the shareholders and back firmly on policyholders.
By November 2006, the “gamble” that policyholders in the Norwich Union fund had underwritten was coming good. Two and a half strong years for stock markets and commercial property meant that the 0.75% per year charge had been worth paying for those with policies maturing at that time.
The Norwich Union fund policyholders weren’t the only winners. If the CGNU fund was healthy and robust in 2004, just imagine its strength at the end of 2006! It was ripe and bursting at the seams.
It was time to make progress with a fund merger. To get the CGNU slush fund in the same proportion as the Norwich Union fund they needed to skim off the excess. £2.1bn of the slush fund was distributed to CGNU policyholders as Special Distributions in 2008, 2009 and 2010, with 10% of the Special Distribution going to shareholders.
The plan to merge the two funds came as part of a reattribution offer, where CGNU fund policyholders would be allowed to deny themselves any potential future Special Distributions if they accept an offer from the shareholders to buy them out of any potential windfall. In the summer of 2008, shareholders were willing to pay £1bn for the right to future windfalls from policyholders.
Well, everything was going to plan until October 2008 when the management heard a little sniffle from the CGNU fund and it started complaining about a sore throat. Those Special Distributions had a double whammy effect of £2.1bn less slush fund for tough times like these, and £2.1bn more liabilities. Oh dear. Too many liabilities and not enough slush fund was the problem the Norwich Union fund had!
At the end of 2007 the CGNU fund had 71.5% in shares and commercial property but by the end of 2008 this had dropped to 55.7%. In my opinion the reduction of risky assets was a direct result of falling asset values relative to the size of liabilities, combined with a much reduced slush fund.
So it looks like the CGNU fund can now match the Norwich Union fund for the size of its inherited estate. How long before they join policyholders in the Norwich Union fund by paying an extra 0.75% per year? After all, they continued to charge 0.75% to Norwich Union policyholders even before the severe market correction.
It’s hardly surprising that the 2008 reattribution offering was taken off the table last week. £1bn is a lot to pay for the now remote prospect of future Special Distributions and for increasing the risk to shareholders in the process.
Right Here, Right Now
And right here, right now, how pleased and rewarded do the Norwich Union With Profits fund policyholders feel about the extra 3.75% they’ve paid over the past five years in charges they hadn’t bargained on when they took out their plans?
If the fund had matched its guarantees and invested fully in UK Gilts like some of its competitors instead of applying the extra charge and taking investment risks, investors might have enjoyed a return similar to the Norwich Union Gilt (S4) Life Fund which has grown by 25.1% over the past 5 years. Instead the fund they are in, after the extra 0.75% charge, has grown by 19.5% over the past five years. In others words, for policyholders with plans maturing today, the strategy has backfired.
Five years on and gilts would have seen a better return that that achieved due to the extra 0.75% charge:
NU Gilt Life (S4) data taken from Trustnet on 5th Feb 2009. With Profits data taken from Norwich Union Information Sheet to Accompany PPFM January 2009 with 0.75% per year deducted from returns.
While I’m sure these policyholders don’t blame Aviva for the global financial crisis, they have every right to feel aggrieved about the risk and reward strategy adopted for them. Was the extra charge a method to increase returns for those policyholders or was it part of a strategy for improving efficiencies and therefore profits to shareholders through fund merger while also attempting to release some of the surplus in the CGNU fund for the benefit of shareholders?
Maybe the CGNU policyholders should be thanking the Norwich Union policyholders for creating the position where they can enjoy ‘Special Distributions’? Or maybe they should be cursing the outcome of reducing their slush fund as it seems that their fund is now not the healthy and robust fund it once was.
Whatever your opinion on the motives and actions taken, the whole process raises important questions about the attractiveness of With Profits as an investment. The extra charges that can be applied at will, the lack of control over how your fund is invested, the fact that shareholders can take 10% of the profit on your investment without seemingly ever bearing the brunt of financial risk because they simply increase charges, all adds up to With Profits being a deeply questionable investment vehicle for many savers.
For some, the guarantees make up for the disadvantages but if the guarantees on your own plan are negligible, is it really worth the shenanigans?